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1 Introduction
At the present the European Union and a large number of member states are in the course of
changing their water management policies in the direction of more integrated and sustainable
management regimes (Bressers and Kuks, 2003). This transformation comes to expression in
the adoption of the Integrated Coastal Zone Management initiative (ICZM)1 and the Water
Framework Directive (WFD)2. With the adoption of the WFD the EU intends to stimulate a
more holistic and territorially integrated approach to solving water-related problems (Moss,
2004). The idea is that institutional arrangements must be developed who take knowledge
of local users serious, who protects the interest and rights of local stakeholders, while at
the same time having the mechanisms to adapt to new insights, knowledge or changes in
the institutional context of the arrangement (Young, 2002). Such institutional arrangements
must be capable of handling the dynamics of the ecosystem and maintaining system integrity
and ecological resilience. In other words, the EU is switching to an ecosystem management
approach.
In this process special attention must be paid to estuaries, because they are unusual
cases. The problems in this type of ecosystem are much more complex than, for instance, in
rivers. Managing an estuary is a complex balancing act of a mix of very diﬀerent interests,
stakeholders and resources. Of all the (aquatic) ecosystems, estuaries are the highest valued3
and probably the ones most endangered by human activities (Blaber et al., 2000; Edgar et al.,
2000). They are small, very attractive, events far upstream can have an important impact,
and they concentrate materials like environmental pollutants and sediments (Branch, 1999).
Estuaries are also the intersection between land, river and sea/ocean. This means that they
are very attractive for settlement, industry, harbors and trading Hoare (2002). Add to this
the huge biodiversity( and related food producing capacity) and recreational opportunities,
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1Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2002 concerning the imple-
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2Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a
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1and it is not strange that large trading and cultural centers have been established in their
vicinity (e.g. London near the Themes, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Gent in the estuarine area
of Rhine, Maas en Schelde) (Commissie, 1994).
Some useful lessons can be learned from the fact that in the United States almost 20 years
ago, the EPA already started a programme for managing the 28 most important estuaries of
national signiﬁcance on the basis of ecosystem management. This programme is called the
‘National Estuary Programme’4. Given the long standing experience with ecosystem manage-
ment and estuaries, the legal regimes governing these estuaries can provide useful insights as
to how ecosystem management policies can be speciﬁed and institutionalized (Keiter, 1998).
This can be done by analyzing existing structures and examining their performance. To that
end we shall start by taking stock of the (economic) natural resources management litera-
ture and theories about legal institutions which can provide frameworks for the analysis of
integrated management of estuaries.
In the current literature on natural resources management, much attention is given to
the importance of institutions (see for instance Ostrom (1990); Veeman and Politylo (2003);
Cortner et al. (1998)). This is especially the case, where the responsibility for our natural
resources is looked at from a more integrated ecosystem approach or landscape perspective
(S¨ oderqvist et al., 2000). Institutions are considered to provide the mechanisms by which
individuals can resolve social dilemmas (Steins, 1999). They are sets of rules that people
have created in order to controle/regulate the behaviour of people using a natural resource.
The idea is that institutions must deﬁne and restrict access to and control over the resources,
so that they can give the appropriate incentives to users and theoretically guarantee the
sustainability of natural resources (Ostrom et al., 1999). This way a ‘tragedy of the commons’
(Hardin, 1968) can be averted.
Institutions are complexes composed of ‘rights’ (claims, duties, privileges and exposures).
These complexes of ‘rights’ may take various forms across diﬀerent types of resources and/or
diﬀerent institutional contexts (Cole, 2000). In other words, institutions governing natural
resources may create diﬀerent legal regimes (Bromley, 1991). For optimal governance, a legal
regime must constitute a nested system of powers and authorities, so that it can adapt to
changing circumstances, changes in institutional contexts and new scientiﬁc insights (Dietz
et al., 2003).
Ensuring that people receive the right incentives often involves awarding them with pro-
perty rights in natural resources (Devlin and Grafton, 1998). Property right regimes are
often seen as both cause and solution for natural resource or environmental problems. Pro-
perty rights induce people to behave in certain ways, and to avoid behaving in certain
others(Dahlman, 1980). The idea is to alter or establish a (private) property right regimes,
so that it is generating the appropriate incentives (again). Property right regimes restrict
and govern access and use of natural resources. For this to happen, a relation must be es-
tablished between a decision unit and one or more resources. Each decision unit will have
certain interests in the management of the resources, and such interests will ﬁnd expression in
claims made by the decision unit. When such claims are judicially conﬁrmed and given formal
protection we say that property rights are attributed to decision units (Bromley, 1991).
Hardin (1968) already saw two solutions to restricting access and use, namely privatization
and regulation. Privatization means that a decision unit must be given private ownership of
its resource. One person is given absolute control over the access and nobody can legally
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2exploit it without his authorization. The other option is regulation. Regulation can either
be government-regulation or self-regulation of users themselves. Both regimes will reduce or
eliminate incentives to over exploitation, by (self) imposed restrictions on users and modes
of use.
Both options, privatization and regulation, have been recognized and discussed extensi-
vely by legal and economic scholars. This would suggest that there is some sort of common
understanding about what property rights are. But, as Cole and Grossman (2002) already
noted, this is actually not the case. Economic conceptions of property rights diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from legal conceptions. Almost all economic scholars discussing the alternative options
of privatization and regulation fail to discern that both are property-based (Cole, 2002). Re-
gulation cannot exist without a legal regime giving some decision units, the state or a group
of (self-regulating) users, control over (some part) of a resource. The diﬀerence between the
two is not the existence or non-existence of property rights, but the type of property rights
regime used (Cole, 2002).
Rights, duties and powers/authority are granted on the basis of rules. In the past much
research has been conducted concerning the eﬀects of single (legal) rules. Nowadays, research
concentrates on the role of (legal) rules in the wider context of, so called, ‘institutional
conﬁgurations’ (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995) governing natural resources. For that purpose
institutional theories5 that provide frameworks for detailed analysis that can also be used as
the basis of economic analysis are required. are capable to handle such detail and which can
be used as the basis of a economic analysis. In this article, a legal theoretical view of regimes
for governing natural resources is taken as a starting point. It is an attempt to discover
the common ground on which legal and economic scholars can discuss the natural resource
management issues. This will be done by presenting the ‘underlying unities in legal doctrines
and institutions’ (Posner, 2004).
In the coming section, the Institutional Legal Theory (ILT)6 will be brieﬂy introduced.
Then we will go deeper into the form and content of legal institutions. In the third section
the forms of legal institutions are discussed. Concerning the content of these legal institutions
(section four), we look into the literature on bundles of property rights. To that end, attention
will be paid to the four ‘fundamental legal relations’ distinguished by the American legal
theorist Hohfeld (1919) and the possibility of combining them with economic conceptions
of property rights. The last section (ﬁve) will provide a research agenda for applying the
economic analysis of legal institutions, as presented in this paper, to the management of
estuaries.
2 Institutional Legal Theory
Any contemporary legal theory has a signiﬁcant analytical component. Successful analysis
requires that the theory is capable of describing the components of a legal system, the logical
relationships between them, and the ways in which all legal phenomena and operations in the
legal system can be described in the terms of these components and relations (MacCormick
and Weinberger, 1992). ILT analyzes the legal order as a universe consisting of a multitude
5Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003) make a distinction between institutional theories and theories of institutions.
They state that an institutional theory ‘seeks an understanding of the relations between institutions, behaviour
and outcomes’ while a theory of institutions seeks ‘explanation why some institutional features come into
existence, and persist, while others are either non-existent or transient’.
6Others refer to it as the Institutional Theory of Law (ITL), see MacCormick and Weinberger (1992).
3of relatively independent systems of rules (legal institutions) rather than, as was usual in
traditional legal theory, concentrating on logical and other relations between single legal
norms and rules (Ruiter, 1993, 2001). Legal institutions are the buildings blocks for (re-
)constructing legal orders (MacCormick and Weinberger, 1992; Wessel, 1999).
But what are legal institutions? To understand this, we will ﬁrst take a look at the
concept of institutions. Nelson and Sampat (2001) have reviewed the literature dealing with
the question how institutions aﬀect economic performance. Their survey reveals that the
concept of an ‘institution’ means diﬀerent things to diﬀerent scholars, both within economics
and across social sciences. The question they raise is whether the concept has a single coherent
meaning, and their answer is in the negative. Although such a uniﬁed content may be lacking,
there yet appears to be general agreement on a broad conception of institutions as systems of
rules that provide frameworks for social action within larger rule-governed settings. Keman
(1997) has surveyed a great number of deﬁnitions of institutions used in neo-institutionalists
approaches. He found the following general concept of institutions: sets of rules that occur in
social reality in the form of recurrent behaviour that complies with those rules. Institutions
are not only eﬀect-producing, but are also distinct “realities that shape patterns of behaviour
of individuals, groups and organizations” (Keman, 1997).
This deﬁnition of institutions is used as point of reference (Ruiter, 2001) in ILT. Legal
institutions are systems of legal rules governing speciﬁc social action in the context of a com-
prehensive social order, which purport to meet with general acceptance. General acceptance
means that they are socially taken into account as a factual situation (Ruiter, 2004).
There are three reasons for choosing ILT and its legal institutions for studying legal re-
gimes governing estuaries. The ﬁrst reason is that by describing legal regimes in terms of legal
institutions they can be compared systematically (). Much researchers comparing diﬀerent
laws or legal regimes in diﬀerent legal regimes compare them without the use of a common
denominator. This means their descriptions can get distorted because they compare concepts
which have they think have the same name, but in reality can have diﬀerent contents. Or
they compare by looking with lenses focussed by their own legal system, so their descriptions
are biased towards their own legal system. By using legal institutions as his ‘tertium com-
paratione’ (van Wageningen, 2003) a researcher can stay clear of these problems when he is
describing, analyzing and comparing legal regimes. The second reason is that with ILT a
researcher can make detailed and systematic descriptions of legal regimes, which, combined
with Hohfeldian legal relations (4.1), can be used for total cost analysis(6.1.1). The last rea-
son for using ILT is that because of the detailed and systematically description, it is easy
to detect institutional interplay. Within the ﬁeld of environmental law and planning law a
lot of authorities (agencies, municipalities, states, etc.) have the power to set rules. Because
these rules are set on diﬀerent levels of government, are set within diﬀerent policy ﬁelds and
bear on the same people or objects, it is not uncommon that they interact. This interaction
can be beneﬁcial, because the rules are complementary, but the rules can also conﬂict with
each other. With ILT a researcher is able to detect the interplay, because he can show the
eﬀect rules have on the behaviour of subjects. If the rules are complementary, a researches
will see that the rules restrict or enable diﬀerent behavioural options. If they conﬂict, he will
detect that one allows/denies a subject to choose a certain course of action, and the other
rules won’t.
43 Legal institutions
If legal institutions are socially taken to be taken into account as factual situations, their
form must be such that they can actually be conceived of as particular situations. That is to
say, as existent. There are three basis forms of particular situations7:
1. The existence of a certain entity. (There is an Eiﬀeltower.)
2. A certain existing entity having a certain property. (The Eiﬀeltower is made of steel.)
3. Certain existing entities having a certain connection. (The Eiﬀeltower is near the
Louvre.)
The category of entities can be further divided in two, namely subjects, which can perform
acts, and objects, which can be acted upon. With the aid of both distinctions, a classiﬁcation
of particular situations and therefore also of legal institutions can be constructed. The idea is
that this classiﬁcation is exhaustive, because there are subjects and objects, which can only
have a limited number of relations (Wessel, 2001). The diﬀerent kinds of legal institutions
can be characterized as follows(Ruiter, 1997, 2001, 2004):
Legal Persons A legal person is a valid legal r´ egime with the form of an entity
that can act. Example: the European Community.
Legal Objects A legal object is a valid legal r´ egime with the form of an entity
that can serve as the object of (trans)actions. Example: a conveyable right
of ownership.
Legal Qualities A legal quality is a valid legal r´ egime with the form of a cha-
racteristic of a subject. The legal regime regulates the behavioural relation
between that particular subject and all other subjects. Example: a person’s
legal majority.
Legal Status A legal status is a valid legal r´ egime with the form of a charac-
teristic of an object. The legal regime regulates the behavioural relations
between particular subjects responsible for that object and all others sub-
jects. Example: a listed historical monument.
Legal Connections A personal legal connection is a valid legal r´ egime with the
form of a connection between subjects. The legal regime regulates the be-
havioural relations between those particular subjects. Example: a personal
right.
Legal Conﬁgurations A legal conﬁguration is a valid legal r´ egime with the form
of a connection between objects. The legal regime regulates the behavioural
relations between particular subjects with certain relations towards each of
the objects. Example: an easement, that is, a legal r´ egime with the form of a
connection between a servient tenement and a dominant tenement consisting
in a burden (e.g. a right of way) laid on the former for the beneﬁt of the
latter. All successive owners of the servient tenement are obligated to bear
the burden and all successive owners of the dominant tenement are entitled
to treat the former as thus obligated.
7See also Ruiter (1997).
5Objective Legal Connections An objective legal connection is a valid legal
r´ egime with the form of connection between a subject and an object. The le-
gal regime regulates the behavioural relations between a particular subject in
the legal connection and all other subjects. Example: ownership of property.
4 Content of legal institutions
In the previous section we have discussed diﬀerent forms of legal institutions as distinguished
by ILT. However, in order to make an adequate and correct analysis of legal institutions
possible, a theory must also not only take notice of diﬀerent forms, but also take their contents
into account (Coleman and Kraus, 1986). ILT identiﬁes as contents of legal institutions their
‘ranges of behaviour’. That is, the behavioural patterns regulated by them. To illustrate the
content of ‘ranges of behaviour’, we will analyze property rights and the ‘ranges of behaviour’
regulated by them.
Property rights are systems of legal relations that ‘link a person to an object against all
other persons’ (Bromley, 1989). Property rights are social institutions, because they, just
like other institutions, structure human relations to attain certain goals. This structuring
takes place in a system of relations between individuals (Hallowell, 1943). Property relations
are created by human communities to mediate individual and collective behaviours regarding
objects and circumstances of value to members of the community (Bromley, 1998). This
means that all activities which individuals and the community are at liberty or are required to
do or not to do, with reference to the object claimed as property, must be deﬁned (Commons,
1934).
It is generally accepted now that property rights compromises complex aggregates of legal
relationships made up of claims, privileges, powers and immunities (Hohfeld, 1919)8, which
can be seen as a ‘bundle of rights’(Penner, 1996). This view is recognizable in the current
(economic) property rights literature. Property rights are thought of as a bundle in the sense
that a general description of them will allow for some kind of subdivision into ‘elementary
rights’. There are diﬀerent conceptions of the bundles of rights. Therefore we will look into
some accepted conceptualizations of these bundles. Because these property rights concepts
are all of the form ‘subject in relation to an object’, it might be interesting to see if they
also have the same content. In order to make the comparison, we turn to the rights concepts
of Hohfeld (1919). His rights concepts can function as common denominators for describing
and analyzing the content of the diﬀerent property rights concepts. This is possible because
Hohfeld has succeeded in reducing the language of the law to a few essential and fundamental
legal concepts answering to the standards of simplicity, precision, and universality (Hoebel,
1968). They are fundamental because they ‘express the vitally important relations of men
with each other in any judicial or governmental system’ Corbin (1964).
4.1 Hohfeld
Hohfeld was driven by his dissatisfaction with the indiscriminate use of the term ‘right’in
the legal practice of his time. Hohfeld noticed that the idea of someone’s having a right
8These aggregates can diﬀer between people. Hohfeld uses on p.30 the example of the diﬀerence between
the fee simple owner and the easement owner;‘the fee simple owner’s aggregate of legal relations is far more
extensive than the aggregate of the easement owner’.
6X’s duty towards Y jural correlative Y’s claim on X
jural opposite jural opposite
X’s privilege10towards Y jural correlative Y’s no-claim on X
Table 1: Hohfeld’s ﬁrst order set of legal relations
to something is really a cluster of related ideas if we may judge from common legal uses of
the word ‘right’. This causes much unnecessary ambiguity. Contrary to the saying that for
every right there is a correlative duty, he pointed out that some rights have such correlates
while others have not (Perry, 1977). His analysis of fundamental legal relations was intended
to show that the term ‘right’ is used in four diﬀerent senses. For this purpose, Hohfeld
distinguishes four legal relations, which contain his eight fundamental conceptions. These
conceptions constitute the ‘lowest common denominators of the law’ (Hohfeld, 1919).
Hohfeld started his analysis by stating that ‘rights’ are used in a very broad sense, and
used to denote very diﬀerent concepts. Therefore he tried to limit the concept to a coherent
set of concepts, or ‘relations’ as Hohfeld calls them, with deﬁnite and appropriate meanings.
The ﬁrst set of concepts is claim-duty. This means that someone (X) who has a duty, has a
legal obligation towards the claim-holder (Y) to take or refrain from taking a certain course
of conduct. Y’s claim that X should or shouldn’t do something is equivalent to X’s duty
towards Y to take that course of conduct like he is obliged to do. Hohfeld calls equivalent
legal conceptions ‘jural correlatives’, which means that the existence of one necessarily implies
the other. If such concepts cannot exist together in one person in respect of the same thing,
he calls them ‘opposites’ (Kamba, 1974).
The second legal relation Hohfeld discerns is the one between ‘privilege’ and ‘no-claim’.
A ‘privilege’ means that X may do or do not as he chooses. In equivalent terms, a privilege
means that X is not under a duty to perform some action, in contrary, he is free9 to choose
the course of conduct he wants to take. This means that Y cannot claim that X should take
some course of action, therefore his positions is named ‘no-claim’. But at the other end, Y
may interfere with X. This is possible, because X does not have a claim against Y (because
Y has no duty not to interfere).
The ﬁrst order set of legal relations of Hohfeld which are discussed above, can be found
in table 1.
‘Power’ and ‘exposure’ are the third Hohfeldian relation. ‘Power’ is the legal capacity to
alter legal relations. It is one’s aﬃrmative control over a given relation as against another.
These other persons are exposed to the power of the former, and have no capability to ‘fend
oﬀ’ the changes decided upon by the person having a power they are exposed to. As far
as the alterable relations are fundamental legal relations of the ﬁrst order, this amounts to
legal capacity of replacing existing duty-claim-relations by liberty-no-claim-relations and vice
versa. However, although Hohfeld himself does not elaborate on this implication, ‘power’ may
also be the legal capacity to alter legal relations of the second order. This amounts to the
legal capacity of replacing existing power-exposure-relations by disability-immunity-relations
and vice versa. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that fundamental legal relations of
the ﬁrst and second orders need not be between the same persons. In many situations, X and
Y have either a duty-claim-relation or a liberty-no-claim-relation, while commonly having a
9Of course this freedom is not unlimited. Some restrictions are set, but within these restrictions, a person
is free to do whatever he wants.
7X’s power towards Y jural correlative Y’s exposure11towards X
jural opposite jural opposite
X’s immunity for Y jural correlative Y’s disability towards X
Table 2: Hohfeld’s second order set of legal relations
power-exposure-relation or a disability-immunity-relation with Z concerning their ﬁrst-order
legal relation. In such tripartite relations, Z is legally (in)capable of changing an existing
ﬁrst-order legal relation between X and Y (Ruiter, 2003)
The fourth and last of Hohfeld’s legal relations is the one between ‘immunity’ and ‘disa-
bility’. An immunity means that X is exempted from the eﬀect Y’s power. This means that
legal relations vested in X cannot be changed by the acts Y. This means that Y is under a
disability so far as changing the relations X has with Y or a third party concerned.
The second order set of legal relations of Hohfeld which are discussed above, can be found
in table 2.
4.2 Bundle of rights
Now we have found a way to render diﬀerent deﬁnitions of property rights in the same ‘lan-
guage’, we can turn our attention to conceptualizations leading to such diﬀerent deﬁnitions.
Several conceptualizations (e.g. (Honor´ e, 1961)12 and (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974)) are
possible, but although it looks like they are really diﬀerent, on the most important accounts
they are the same(van de Griendt, 2004). The choice has been made to take the approach of
Schlager and Ostrom ?. This approach is chosen, because it is more precise and its concep-
tualization relates better to the total cost analysis (6.1.1).
Schlager and Ostrom (1992)Ostrom and Schlager (1996) present ‘a conceptual schema for
arraying property-rights regime that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights that may
be held by the users of a resource system’. They distinguish four classes of property rights
holders, namely owner, proprietor, claimant and authorized user. Each position has its own
associated bundle of rights. These bundles contain one or more property rights. Schlager and
Ostrom discern ﬁve diﬀerent property rights(p.250-251), which they deﬁne as:
access The right to enter a deﬁned physical property.
withdrawal The right to obtain the ‘products’ of a resource (e.g., catch ﬁsh, appropriate
water, etc.).
management The right to regulate internal use patterns and to transform a resource by
making improvements.
exclusion The right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be
transferred.
alienation The right to sell or lease either or both of the above-mentioned collective-choice
rights. (p.250-251)
With what kind of Hohfeldian relations (3 are we dealing here? A right of access, gives
the holder a privilege to enter the property and at the same time, gives others a no-claim.
12Both Becker (1977) and Munzer (1990) have rendered Honore’s elements into Hohfeldian terms.
8Schlager & Ostrom Hohfeld
access privilege to enter a deﬁned physical property 13
withdrawal privilege to the products of an object 14
management power to determine usage of object
exclusion power to determine access to object
alienation power to transfer rights
Table 3: Property rights of Schlager & Ostrom in Hohfeldian terms
Owner Proprietor Authorized
Claimant
Authorized
User
Authorized
Entrant
Access x x x x x
Withdrawal x x x x
Management x x x
Exclusion x x
Alienation x
Table 4: Bundles of rights associated with types of owners (?)
This means that they cannot claim that the privilege holder must take some course of action.
But at the other hand, it does not mean that they must not interfere with the formers
access. A situation of non-interference can only exist if the privilege is reinforced with claim
rights, giving other persons then the privilege holder a duty not to interfere. A subject with
withdrawal rights a liberty to obtain products produced by the resource. Others cannot claim
that he should not take them. Here the same situation as with the access rights, they must
be reinforced with claim rights before a situation of non-interference comes into existence.
A person with management rights has a power because he has the capacity to change the
relations between himself and other people wanting access or withdrawal rights. If he has not
giving them ‘rights’, they are under a duty to not take any products. If he has used his power
and given them rights, the situation and the legal relations are changed. Then the ‘manager’
is under a duty not to keep them from taking products, and thereby respecting their claims.
This is the same for exclusion rights, the person holding them has a power. Also the right of
alienation is a power, because the owner of this right may change his position to the object
in relation to others, and let someone else partly or totally take over his position. For that to
happen, he must change the legal relation between him and the new ‘owner’. Because he has
transferred some of his rights, he cannot claim anymore that the new ‘owner’ should refrain
from taking a course of action in relation to the object. The diﬀerent rights are summarized
in table 3.
How these property rights can enable us in making distinctions among the diﬀerent cate-
gories of property right holders, is shown in table 4.
Individuals holding only access rights are called ‘Authorized Entrants’ by Ostrom & Schla-
ger. An example is the tourist who has bought a ticket for visiting a national park. If indivi-
duals also hold withdrawal rights, they are called ‘authorized users’. If speciﬁed in the rules,
these access and withdrawal rights could be temporarily (lease) or permanently (sale, granted
or assigned) transferred to others. An example is persons holding a permit or individual
transferable quotas. The rights of access and the rights of withdrawal are determined by the
persons holding the management and exclusion rights. ‘Authorized Claimants’ have, next to
9their access and withdrawal rights, management rights. This means that they may devise
a set of withdrawal rules, with which they can determine and coordinate the usage of the
resource. An example would be a group of ﬁshers together determining the ﬁshing rules for
their joint property. Authorized claimants cannot determine who has access to the resource.
People who have this extra exclusion right are called ‘Proprietors’. Proprietors decided who
may have access to the resource, how it may be utilized, but they may not sell it. An example
would be a committee governing the usage of a resource, which is not authorized to sell the
property. The right of alienation is only reserved for ‘Owners’. Owners have the complete
bundle of rights.
The Ostrom-Schlager conceptualization is based on and applied to single-use and local-
community level institutional arrangements, mostly local ﬁshery or lobster communities (see
their examples in their 1992 paper). For our purpose, the analysis of multi-level and multi-use
CPR, the conceptualization must be adapted to accommodate for the positions of governmen-
tal (the state and its agencies) and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s). Therefore we
would like to propose two other types of owners, namely the trustee and the steward. Both
are not self-interested, but goal oriented and are in a principal-agent relation towards this
goal set by others. This means that they do not act on their own behalf, but on the behalf of
others. This is quite diﬀerent from the ‘owners’ of Schlager and Ostrom who all act in their
own best interest. The ‘trustee’ is an agent of the beneﬁciaries (in case of the government, the
‘people’, this can be the current population, but it can also contain future generations) and
tries to act in their best interest. A trustee is not acting on his behalf, but serving a ‘higher
purpose’. To do this, he needs a bundle of rights that contain at least management rights,
exclusion rights and alienation rights. By selling, leasing or granting access and withdrawal
to others, he can generate money for the development/improvement and management of the
resource. If it is in the best interest of the beneﬁciaries to sell the property, he can do that.
With the money he generates, he can buy other property. It is not necessary for the trustee to
have access rights. If he can grant others access to the property, he can do that in such a way
that the end result would be the same as if he would have had access himself. If the trustee
wants to actively improve his property, then it would be logical that he also has access rights.
A good example would be a municipality which is developing and improving pastures into
building lots, which can be sold separately. With selling the building lots, the municipality
is generating money for funding services delivered to its citizens and at the same time, it
is attracting ﬁrms and generating jobs. In this selling process, they do not have to sell the
property to the highest bidder, but they can choose other bidders who’s bid ﬁts better in the
ideas and/or spatial plans of the municipality.
The steward is an agent acting on behalf of (some group of) owners, trying to achieve the
management goals set by these owners. A good example would be a forest service agency
managing the forest owned by the government. For their task of maintenance, preservation
and improvement of the State forests, they would need some tools in the form of access rights,
management rights and exclusion rights. With the access right they can enter the property
and fulﬁl their management tasks. The products which are generated by the improving the
property, can be sold separately. For this the steward does not need withdrawal rights, because
the products are only indirectly generated. They are a sort of proﬁtable waste generated by
the maintenance activities. To keep the property in the right condition, it is necessary that
a steward can set access and withdrawal rights for others. By deﬁning these right, he is in
control of the usage and therefore the condition of the resource and the stream of beneﬁts
generated by the property. With this control he is able to reach his management goals.
10Owner Trustee Proprietor Steward Authorized
Claimant
Authorized
User
Authorized
Entrant
Access x (x) x x x x x
Withdrawal x x x x
Management x x x x x
Exclusion x x x x
Alienation x x
Table 5: Adapted version of table ‘Bundles of rights associated with types of owners’
5 Property rights and collective action
In the property rights theory the main focus is not so much on the diﬀerent owner positions,
but more on the conventional fourfold distinction of property right regimes, namely (Cole,
2002):
State property Individuals have a duty to observe use/access rules determined by a control-
ling/managing agency. Agencies have a power to determine use/access rules.
Private property Individuals have a privilege (reinforced with claim rights) to undertake
socially acceptable uses, and have a duty to refrain from socially unacceptable uses.
Others (called ‘nonowners’) have a duty not to prevent socially acceptable uses, and
have a claim that only socially acceptable uses will occur.
Common property The management group (the ‘owners’) has a power to exclude nonmem-
bers, and nonmembers have a duty to abide by such exclusion. Individual members of
the management group (the ‘co-owners’) have both powers and claims-duties with res-
pect to the use rates and maintenance of the object owned.
Nonproperty There is no deﬁned group of users or ‘owners’ and the beneﬁt stream is avai-
lable to anyone. Individuals have both a privilege and a no claim with respect to use
rates and maintenance of the asset. The asset is an ‘open-access resource’.
Most economists would say that resources should be regulated by assigning one of these
property right regimes. These regimes are ideal-types (Demsetz, 1967), however. In reality,
many natural resources are managed in a way that combines aspects of diﬀerent property
right regimes (Devlin and Grafton, 1998), because resources are not used for one purpose.
Why should a user merely use a forest for collecting wood, if he can also let his cows graze
there (Edwards and Steins, 1998)? The result is that resources are subjected to, sometimes
conﬂicting, multiple-uses for which diﬀerent regimes are in place (Steins, 1999).
To manage such potential resource use conﬂicts, one must choose the right mixes of pri-
vate, community and state property rights to address environmental problems. Together they
can constitute successful institutional arrangements which are able to address the problems
associated with the use of CPR’s. An example of an interesting mix of private and state
rights provides conservation/land trusts (Cole, 2002) that are increasingly important in the
preservation of valued habitats in many countries (Devlin and Grafton, 1998). This brings
us to the point that rather than considering a property right regime, it is more interesting
to look at (legal) persons property rights are assigned to.15 These legal persons can be or-
15Dales (1968) already wrote that the four types of property right regimes reﬂect ideological issues than that
they constitute real distinctions.
11ganizations/institutional arrangements (associations, communities, trusts) who, by vesting
authority in them, can overcome coordination failures inherent in the exploitation of these
multi-use, multi-actor, multi-level CPR’s and economize on total (transaction) costs (Grafton,
2000). Coordination can be very interesting if there is the matter of economies of size, scale
and scope for information gathering, monitoring, enforcement, etc. Especially when there is
a public good aspect to a CPR, the costs of overcoming free rider problems can be very high,
requiring some form of coordination across users, owners, beneﬁciaries, NGO’s and other
concerned parties. An overarching institutional arrangement, creating a single legal regime,
can also be very helpful when CPR’s are jointly used in a number of diﬀerent jurisdictions
and where individuals users cannot enforce property rights and contracts across these juris-
dictions(Grafton, 2000). There are diﬀerent types of legal regimes capable of coordinating
behaviour or making decisions for the collective. These legal regimes can also be described
as personiﬁed legal institutions. An overview of the basic types can be found in the following
section (5.1).
5.1 Personiﬁcation of legal institutions and property right regimes
The source of property rights is not important, important are the incentives it gives to the
decision units. Decision units can operate under diﬀerent property right regimes (Bromley,
1991). To determine the eﬀect of the incentives, we have to know who can decide, which
options he can choose from, how he takes his decisions, how costly this is and to what
extent externalities occur. In all cases, the decision unit is called ‘the owner’. In most legal
traditions, individual ownership is seen as exemplary, despite the fact that most property is
owned jointly (Holderness, 2003). Although the central contrast drawn is generally between
state and private property or ownership, we should bear in mind that through the ages
property has been attributed to a large class of heterogeneous entities (Alchian and Demsetz,
1973). To classify these entities/decision units, we look at the legal subjects distinguished by
ILT. Legal subjects manifest themselves in four basic forms. The ﬁrst form is the physical
person. In addition there are three more categories of legal subjects: legal institutions playing
the role of a subject in order to enable a certain social group to act as a single agent (Ruiter,
2001). Legal personality is a ‘legal status’ of a legal institution which it acquires by a process
of personiﬁcation. Ruiter characterizes this:
Instead of making one comprehensive arrangement about exclusion and/or usage,
between all the owners, this legal connection is personiﬁed. By doing this the
mutual relation between all the owners is changed into one between each owner
and the legal person, with the form of an association. The legal status ‘legal
personality’ has the purport that objects having it will be socially treated as
persons (Ruiter, 2004)
ILT distinguishes three categories of personiﬁed legal institutions, namely:
• associations
• corporations
• foundations
The diﬀerent categories can be characterized as follows16:
16Based on the work of van Wageningen (2003) and Ruiter (2004)
12Association An association is a personiﬁed alliance, based on a long-term multilateral
contractual relation (‘legal connection’) between subjects, with the status of a legal subject.
Decision-making within an alliance is fundamentally governed by the requirement of mutual
contractual agreement. This means that any new decision takes the form of contract renewal.
Furthermore, contractual relations only regard parties to the contract. As a consequence,
no subject in the alliance can conclude contracts with third parties on behalf of the others.
These restrictions can be lifted by personifying the alliance, which is achieved by making the
following adjustments:
1. Contractual consensus is abandoned in favour of collective decision-making processes,
whose results no longer have to conﬁrm to the individual wills of all participants.
2. The abandonment is accompanied by the construction of a generalized will which is
ascribed to the alliance itself. Hereby the alliance gains legal personality and is trans-
formed in an association. After this transformation, it is treated like as a natural
person, has a capacity for rights, is capable of performing legal acts and responsible for
behaviour ﬂowing from its will.
3. At the same time, the original contractual legal relations between participants in the
alliance are replaced by a bundle of legal relations between the association and members.
The membership means that the former participants are entitled to participate and vote
in collective decisions. This membership is the last remnant of the original contract.
When a subject ends its membership, the association can still function normally. Even when
all the original members have gone, the association persists.
Corporation At the root of the ‘corporation’ lies an institutional form belonging to the
basic category of ‘objective legal relation’, which will be termed partnership. This means
that a corporation is a personiﬁed partnership. A corporation is present, when two or more
subjects have joint ownership of one or more objects and/or capital goods. Decision-making
in a partnership is governed by the principle of agreement between partners concerning the
management and disposal of the common property. The partnership is restricted in similar
ways as the alliance. These restrictions can likewise be lifted by personifying the partnership.
This is achieved by making the following adjustments:
1. Joint ownership of property by partners is abandoned in favour of ownership by the
corporation while partners are transformed into shareholders, that is, holders of rights
to certain proportions of the economic value of the corporation’s property (capital)
entitling them to corresponding proportions of the corporation’s proﬁts.
2. The principle of unanimous agreement between partners is abandoned in favour of
collective decision making by a general meeting of shareholders.
3. The idea of an original objective relation between joint owners and their common pro-
perty is replaced by that of a bundle of personal legal relations between the corporation
and its shareholders entitling them to vote in the general meeting.
4. A corporation is treated on a par with physical persons (capacity for rights), is capable
of performing legal acts (legal capacity), and is responsible for behaviour ﬂowing from
the will ascribed to it (legal liability).
13Name NEP Name coordinating organ(s) Institutional form
Albemarle-Pamlico Sounds Coordination Council Alliance
Buzzards Bay Buzzards Bay Action Committee Alliance
17
Casco Bay Oﬃce of Casco Bay + Impl. Committee Alliance
Corpus Christi Bay Estuary Council Alliance
Delaware Inland Bays Delaware Center for the Inland Bays Alliance
18
Puget Sound Puget Sound Action Team Alliance
Tillamook Bay Performance partnership Alliance
Tampa Bay Interlocal Agreement Alliance
Narragansett Bay Narragansett Bay Estuary Program (NBEP)
19 Foundation
Delaware Estuary Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC)
20 Association/Foundation
21
San Francisco Estuary Executive Council/SFBRWQCB
22 ?
23
Table 6: Institutional forms of National Estuary Programs
Foundation The institutional form at the basis of the ‘foundation’ is the fund. Funds
belong to the basic form of ‘objective legal connections’. A fund is someone’s ownership of
a collection of assets that is devoted to a particular objective. Personiﬁcation of a fund is
achieved by making the following adjustments:
1. The position and objective-oriented will of the owner are replaced by the objective-
oriented ownership by the foundation.
2. The objective of the fund is ascribed the status of a will, providing the fund with a
capacity for rights, as well as full legal capacity, while rendering it legally liable.
3. The foundation has neither members nor shareholders.
The raison d’ˆ etre of a foundation is its formal objective, which substitutes for the original
will of the owner.
5.1.1 Coordinating NEP organizations
The NEP of the EPA provides funds and technical assistance for States to develop a Com-
prehensive Conservation and Management Plan (CCMP). This CCMP is required to address
three management areas: water and sediment quality; living resources; and, land use and wa-
ter resources. Where appropriate, it can also address other problems. The goal of the CCMP
is to improve the management of water quality and living resources in an estuary. Individual
estuary programs are given a great deal of ﬂexibility in determining how their plans will be
implemented (Imperial et al., 2000). As reference for looking at relevant legal (personiﬁed)
institutions, we have looked at the institutional forms of some of the coordinating organiza-
tions implementing the NEP (table 6). This overview shows us that most of the NEP are
based on the ‘alliance’ form, but not all. Especially the CCMP of NEPs which were among
the ﬁrst to be implemented have an association or foundation as institutional form. It would
be interesting to see if these individual NEP perform more or less eﬃciently as the others.
6 Research agenda
The former chapters showed the capabilities of ILT for analyzing legal regimes for integrated
management of estuaries. These legal regimes are based on the ecosystem management ap-
proach. Ecosystem approaches to management often look beyond speciﬁc jurisdictions and
14focus on broad spatial scales (Brody et al., 2004). To be able to design a legal regime for
integrated management of estuaries, it is necessary to make a comparative assessment of
the performance of real legal regimes (Cole, 2002). This way we can try to determine the
circumstances in which one or the other legal regimes is more optimal/suited for integrated
governance of estuaries. For optimality we would like to look at the adaptive eﬃciency of the
legal regimes. This means that the legal regime determining the ownership and governance
arrangements, should minimizing the sum of organization costs and transaction costs (Sun,
2002). Institutionalism is particularly well suited for comparative research (Diermeier and
Krehbiel, 2003). For comparing legal regimes, it must be possible to analyze them without
reference to the legal system (common, civil, etc.) in which the legal regime is ‘located’.
By using ILT a researcher can compare with ease, without any ‘translation’ problems (ILT is
already applied in diﬀerent ﬁelds, for instance international organisations (Wessel, 1999), uni-
versities (van Wageningen, 2003) and municipalities (Ruiter, 1995)). This is possible, because
ILT is a legal meta-language, which enables the comparison of legal regimes with the help
of the common denominator(s)it presents (van Wageningen, 2003). The legal institutions of
ILT are this denominator which enable a researcher to name all ‘building blocks’ which legal
regimes are made out of (Wessel, 1999). All legal regimes can be rendered in the same basic
forms with the same terms for their content (range of behaviour). This is the basis a resear-
cher needs for the comparison of legal regimes which are part of other legal systems and/or
several diﬀerent jurisdictions. But how to determine the eﬃciency of these legal regimes?
6.1 Analysis of legal regimes
Diﬀerent property regimes are used for managing natural resources. Each type (private,
public, common or open access) has proven to be successful in some instances, but none of
them in all cases. So, which property rights regime must be selected in which situation? Each
property rights regime has associated with it a particular structure of costs. These costs are
not expected to be the same for each type of property regime (Bromley, 1991). So which then
is the best one? Cole (2002, p.131) says:
The ‘best’ property regime for environmental protection is that which achieves
society’s exogenously set environmental protection goals at the lowest total cost,
deﬁned as the sum of exclusion and coordination costs given the environmen-
tal amenities targeted and their ecological circumstances, economies or diseco-
nomies of scale, technological capabilities, and institutional and organizational
constraints.
The best legal regime would be the one with the highest cost-eﬀectiveness. This is the legal
regime which given a set of aims, achieves them at the least-total-cost(Rose, 1991). But what
are the costs we are talking about and what are the eﬀects?
6.1.1 Total cost analysis
What we are looking for are the costs associated with the institutional arrangement used
for conducting activities in relation to the ecosystem at hand. In other words, the cost of
running this system, ‘transaction costs’24. These costs are related to the form and content of
the property rights established by the institutional arrangement. By looking at these forms
24I agree with Cheung (1998) that it would be better to have called them institution costs
15and contents, we can observe the level of transaction costs, by using the theory of Smith
(2002). For determining the total level of costs, Smith argues that it is important to answer
two questions. The ﬁrst is: What collection of attributes is treated as a unit for describing
permitted or forbidden activities?
Natural resources which are subject of a property rights regime, can be seen as a bundle
of valuable attributes, of which each individually is costly to measure. Therefore the property
rights on these attributes are also costly to deﬁne and enforce. However, not all methods
are as costly. Because of these issues, people setting up a system of property rights will try
to economize on measurement costs. They do this by using a more or less rough ‘proxy’ for
describing the property. Objects can then be treated as a whole or divided into spatial or time
or functional slices. This way a trade-oﬀ can be made between the costs and beneﬁts of a more
precise ‘proxy’. This ‘proxy’ is the unit to which a range of behaviour can be attached. When
rough ‘proxies’ like borders are used, a large class of activities will be bundled and not deﬁned
separately. When such a proxy is used, we are looking at an exclusion right. This exclusion
right is not absolute, because there will always be rules who will permit (right of way) or
not forbid (enjoying the scenery) activities of others. But we speak of exclusion, because
such a large and indeﬁnite class of uses is bunched together under a single owner control,
that it looks like that access to the resource without permission of the owner is denied. The
single owner will function as a gatekeeper. He is responsible for the decisions about and the
monitoring of speciﬁc activities with regard to the resource. He can control these activities
by regulating the access to the resource. For this he has to make ‘exclusion costs’. They are
the costs of drawing and enforcing boundaries to restrict access to and use of the resource to
the owner(s) of the property (Cole, 2002). These exclusion rights are used when the group
of duty holders is large, and the simplicity of the rough proxy reduces the processing costs,
which would otherwise be very high.
At the opposite, the people setting up a property regime can also set governance rules.
Governance rules are rules which pick out uses and users in more detail. These rules can be
supplied by norms, contracts and regulation. This means they can be set by the government
or a group of users who close a mutual contract, determining usage of their joint property.
Governance costs are costs of negotiating these arrangements, coordinating decisions and
monitoring and enforcing the rules set by the arrangement. It is very hard to separate the
eﬀects of the diﬀerent uses and coordinate the activities of the diﬀerent users. When a lot
of users are using the resource at the same time, it is very hard to determine the eﬀect of
a single individual by only (being able) to look at the total output. The more speciﬁed the
rules, the more eﬀort it will take to communicate these rules to all users and for them to
remember them and act accordingly. So more precision of rules lead to higher monitoring
and enforcement costs.
Exclusion and governance diﬀer in the proxies selected and are opposites of each other.
But that does not mean that when setting up a property regimes you have to choose for either
one. They are poles of a continuum, with hybrid solutions in between. For instance, exclusion
rights can be used to deny access to a large group of people, only leaving a small group of users
to be controlled by governance rules. So it shows that it might be more interesting in some
cases to use a mix of both exclusion rights and governance rules. Which proxy ultimately
gets selected depends on the total costs. When a rough proxy is used, the marginal cost of
exclusion is low but increases rapidly with higher levels of precision. But the marginal cost of
16governance rules may be higher than for exclusion rules at the same initial level of precision25,
but may increase less rapidly.
For determining the level of costs it is not necessary to make an accurate calculation. As
long as by comparing diﬀerent levels of transaction cost of diﬀerent legal regimes an estimate
can be made about the relative order of magnitude (Furubotn and Richter, 1991), then the
transaction costs are measurable at the margin and hypothesis can be tested (Cheung, 1998).
For determining the level of precision, we will look at the level of speciﬁcation. Rights
are precise or speciﬁed to the extent that they protect attributes by preventing a range of
unauthorized actions. The level of speciﬁcation will be somewhere between the level of total
speciﬁcation and total absence of speciﬁcation. Total speciﬁcation means that for every use of
every attribute every potential Hohfeldian relation is speciﬁed between every pair of members
of the society. Total absence of speciﬁcation is a situation where no rules are set and no
property rights are assigned. We are talking then about total anarchy or open access regimes.
To determine the level of precision of a proxy, we will observe if it is possible to distinguish
more attributes of each other and if it is possible to measure the level of the individual
attributes. Smith explains it with the following example:
For example, a fence around Blackacre allows one to distinguish situations in
which person A is or is not physically present on Blackacre. This is a reasonable
proxy for whether A is stealing crops, but it is a very rough one; in particular, the
rule overgenerates in the sense that all states of aﬀairs in which A is physically
on Blackacre but not stealing are lumped with those in which A is present and
stealing. The proxy measurement by fencing and monitoring crossings is very
cheap, and, as long as there is little need for A to be present on Blackacre, the
approximate nature of the proxy is not a problem. Now if A being on Blackacre
becomes valuable enough, say because A is a laborer helping harvest, then the
original proxy will not be enough. What is needed is a proxy that will (again)
pick out situations in which A is not present on Blackacre (protecting a wide range
of attributes most of the time) but will break up the case in which A is present on
the land into subcases. For example, one could further distinguish those subcases
in which A is present on the land without containers. The new, more precise rule
will allow A in but only if A does not bring any containers with him and allows
his pockets to be searched. This conditional permission relies on a combination of
the fence and a rule of no containers. It requires more monitoring, but it is also
more precise.(p.S473-S474)
The data needed for such an analysis can be gathered with the analysis proposed in this
paper. By using this method, a comparison between legal regimes and their relative total
cost levels can be made.
25This is because so much uses are authorized, it is very hard to monitor all users, which will lead to a lot
of costs of unmeasured uses. This is much harder then just keeping everybody from using the property
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